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Joel Katz 
In the focus article, Sullivan challenges a commonly held view that pain is a private, subjective experience. He argues that our experience of pain is inescapably con-ceptual, as it arises into our consciousness having been 
shaped and filtered by language. As conceptual, pain is 
essentially a social phenomenon. Sullivan also states that 
a social conception of pain implies changes in our treat-
ment of pain and he concludes by rejecting the cognitive-
behavioral view of pain in favor of a constructivist 
approach that acknowledges the generative influence of 
language on experience. 
PAIN IS PRIVATE AND PUBLIC 
Science seeks to uncover truth through the experimental 
method. Inferences about the causes of observed phe-
nomena are made, specific hypotheses are generated 
and tested, and, from the data obtained, a temporary 
reality is constructed for further evaluation. Many propo-
sitions, however, are not falsifiable and therefore are not 
amenable to this process of empirical refinement. The 
proposition that pain is an inherently private event or 
that it is an essentially social phenomenon falls within 
the realm of the empirically untestable. It is not quite like 
one 's personal religious conviction-either one 
believes, does not believe, or one is unsure. For after 
reading Sullivan 's article, although I was not swayed 
from my belief that pain is a private event, I was per-
suaded that it is also a public phenomenon. 
SOCIAL NATURE OF PAIN 
Sullivan's view provides us with a better understanding 
of how, through the use of language, pain becomes a 
social phenomenon. Perhaps most importantly, it points 
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us in the direction-which some have already taken-of 
trying to understand the social nature of pain from CUl-
tural, societal, and familial perspectives. Sullivan is con-
vincing in his argument that the Cartesian view of pain as 
a private experience has hampered the study of pain as 
a social phenomenon. Only recently have researchers 
begun to investigate pain within families and marital 
dyads. Ironically, a major impetus for the shift to include 
the larger social context has come from the behavioral 
perspective. For example, specific pain behaviors 
(e.g., sighing, limping, or avoiding duties) unwittingly 
may be reinforced (positively or negatively) by a well-
intentioned spouse, thus leading to an increase in the 
frequency of occurrence of these behaviors. Recent 
studies have shown that spouses of chronic pain 
patients may become discriminative cues not only for 
their partners' pain behaviors4.12.19 but also for ratings of 
pain severity.2.12,19 The complexity of the social nature of 
pain is underscored by studies that show that pain 
patients who are satisfied with their level of social sup-
port exhibit more pain behaviors than those who are less 
satisfied,5 and patients with solicitous spouses tend to 
report higher levels of marital satisfaction. 4 Moreover, 
reports from highly solicitous spouses indicate that while 
their partner's pain problem interferes Significantly with 
their lives, they (the spouses) report better mood and a 
greater sense of control over their own lives than do less 
solicitous spouses.4 Finally, the degree of solicitousAess 
appears to interact with pain severity and marital satis-
faction. Within a satisfying marital relationship, patients 
with solicitous spouses report greater pain severity than 
patients with nonsolicitous spouses. However, when 
marital satisfaction is low, the degree of spouse solici-
tousness appears to be unrelated to pain severity.11 
Other studies have confirmed the importance of pain 
as a social phenomenon. The interpersonal strife that 
comes to define the lives of many couples with pain 
affects other close relatives as well. Children from fami-
lies in which one parent suffers from chronic pain may be 
at greater risk for developing adjustment disorders,18 
depressive symptomology,3 or other illnesses,17 com-
pared with children from healthy families or families in 
which one parent has a chronic disease. At present, the 
etiology and developmental course of these adjustment 
problems remain a mystery. We do not know the extent to 
which the behavior problems observed among offspring 
of chronic pain patients stem from parental modeling, 
socialization , reinforcement contingencies, global family 
stress, or genetic factors.16 Nor do we know whether they 
represent precursors of a chronic pain disorder. A better 
understanding of these phenomena can only be achieved 
by further study of the social nature of pain. 
LANGUAGE AND PHANTOM LIMB PAIN 
The only way I can describe it now, is like looking 
out the window, but the window is frosted. You see 
what is there, but you don't see the sharp edges of 
everything. Or, if you touch somebody but there's 
something on the skin so you don't touch the skin, 
but you feel the skin . .. it can be very intense even 
if it is like that .... the feeling is excessive, but it's 
not a pain like if you cut yourself or banged your-
self. It's not that kind of pain . I can't call it a pain. 
It's not a pain . It's not a physical pain, I would say, 
because that (motioning to the space below the 
stump) is not physical . . . and it is. So, how can I 
describe something that is physical and is not? It's 
physical in the way that I feel it, but it's not there. 
So how do you describe something like that? So 
it's painful but it's not a pain. I don't know what else 
to say. - Transcript of audiotaped interview with an 
amputee describing her phantom limb pain. 
Pain words are descriptive labels for sensations. At the 
same time they are also vehicles for defining the nature of 
the relationship between communicating parties. These 
descriptive and relationship (or social) aspects of lan-
guage can and do coexist-notwithstanding Sullivan's 
rejection of pain words as descriptors. But the role of lan-
guage is probably even more complex than we think. 
Language appears to facilitate integration of information 
from various sense modalities.10 Consider one woman's 
bittersweet description of the pins-and-needles sensation 
(paresthesias) so characteristic of phantom limbs, as 
"champagne bubbles and blisters" after a left shoulder 
amputation simultaneously marked the end of a prolonged 
period of suffering and the beginning of life without an 
arm .6 Or, consider the patient with diabetes mellitus who 
describes the burning pain of a putrefying and discolored 
gangrenous ulcer on his toe as "hellfire and brimstone." 
The analogic aspect of the verbal message conveys 
meaning by likening certain qualities (e.g., sensory) of the 
pain experience to some other experience-whether fan-
cied or real-and is aided by using such figures of speech 
as simile, metaphor, and hyperbole, or more subtly 
through allegory. The formation of a higher-order poly-
modal representation of a pain is facilitated by the unifying 
verbal response that captures the entire experience sig-
naled by the contiguous activation of modality-specific 
representations arising from separate sensory channels 
(e.g., visual, olfactory, somatosensory). In this context, 
language functions simultaneously to access multimodal 
representations, strengthen their interconnections, and, 
through convergence of input to neocortical association 
areas, facilitate both the formation of a pain memory as 
well as its reactivation after amputation. 10 
THE McGILL PAIN QUESTIONNAIRE 
(MPQ) AND THE LANGUAGE OF PAIN 
Sullivan's claim that statements such as '" no pain, no 
gain' should have greater clinical importance than the 
endorsement of either 'pricking' or 'excruciating'" misses 
an important contribution that pain questionnaires such as 
the McGill Pain Questionnaire (MPQ) have established, 
namely, diagnostic utility based on description. One of the 
most useful features of the MPQ is its potential value as 
an aid in the differential diagnosis between various pain 
syndromes.14 Melzack et al.15 provided evidence of the 
capacity of the MPQ to discriminate between two types of 
facial pain. Fifty-three patients were given thorough neu-
rological examinations that led to a diagnosis of either 
trigeminal neuralgia or atypical facial pain. Each patient 
rated his or her pain using the MPQ and the scores were 
submitted to a discriminant analysis. Ninety-one percent 
of the patients were correctly classified using seven key 
descriptors. To determine how well the key descriptors 
were able to predict either diagnosis, the discriminant 
function was applied to MPQ scores obtained from an 
independent validation sample of patients with trigeminal 
neuralgia or atypical facial pain . The results showed a cor-
rect prediction for 90% of the patients. Specific verbal 
descriptors of the MPQ have also been shown to discrim-
inate between reversible and irreversible damage of the 
nerve fibers in a tooth,S and between leg pain caused by 
diabetic neuropathy and leg pain arising from other 
cause. 13 Jerome et al.9 further showed that the MPQ dis-
criminates between cluster headache pain and other vas-
cular (migraine and mixed) headache pain. It is clear that 
there are appreciable and quantifiable differences in the 
way various types of pain are described, and that .patients 
with the same disease or pain syndrome tend to use 
remarkably similar words to communicate what they feel. 
The language of pain is a language of description. 
TREATMENT IMPLICATIONS OF PAIN 
AS CONCEPTUAL AND PUBLIC 
Sullivan claims that one important treatment implication 
of viewing pain as conceptual and public is that the "dis-
tinction between respondent and operant pain behavior 
disappears. Once pain language develops, all pain has 
reflexive and social elements." While it is true that pain is 
complex, one must question the presumption that 
because a phenomenon can be viewed from multiple 
perspectives or divided into multiple elements, the dis-
tinction between the elements disappears. For example, 
we do not ignore the distinction between the content and 
relationship elements of communication even though 
every communication contains both elements. 22 A 
spouse of a pain patient may remind his partner that it is 
time to take her pain medication in a solicitous manner 
(e.g., "Here, I've brought you your pills to take") or in a 
critical, punishing way (e.g., "Have you forgotten to take 
your pills again?") Both communications have the same 
content or report aspect but differ in the relationship or 
command aspect. Should we propose to eliminate the 
distinction between these elements of communication 
even though all communications simultaneously inform 
and command us? 
Sullivan does not specify how the absence of a distinc-
tion between respondent and operant pain behavior 
would facilitate treatment. Before we abandon the dis-
tinction, we need explicit information on what treatment 
advantage would be conferred to the patient by not dis-
tinguishing between them. As conceptualized from the 
behavioral perspective, the advantage of distinguishing 
between respondent and operant pain behaviors is that 
they are maintained by different environmental contin-
gencies and thus have different implications for treat-
ment. For example, patients with post-traumatic chronic 
pain syndrome 16 respond well to a combination of exer-
cise therapy, biofeedback, and group supportive therapy, 
but it is not until systematic desensitization is introduced 
that the respondent or classically conditioned pain behav-
iors are extinguished. In some cases, desensitization also 
leads to a further decrease in pain severity. Doing away 
with the distinction simply because we exhibit complex 
behaviors strikes me as a step backward. 
COGNITIVE-BEHAVIOR THERAPY, 
ILLUSIONS OF HEALTH, AND THE 
DEPRESSIVE REALISM HYPOTHESIS 
Sullivan may be selling cognitive-behavior therapy short 
when he dismisses it in favor of a constructivist 
approach on the basis of "data suggesting that mental 
health is not synonymous with the accurate perception 
of interpersonal situations." Sullivan does not provide a 
balanced view of the controversy over whether 
depressed persons perceive situations more accurately 
than nondepressed persons. The pOSition Sullivan 
adopts is based on the depressive realism hypothesis 
that non depressed persons exhibit self-serving biases 
and distortions, whereas depressed persons do not. 
Recent work has challenged the validity of these 
claims.1,2o Many ot the studies that purport to support 
depressive realism do not provide an objective standard 
against which to evaluate the claim. Moreover, of the 
studies that do provide such a standard, almost half tail 
to support the claim that dysphoric or depressed indi-
viduals display a more accurate or realistic perception 
than nondepressed individuals. Finally, the majority of 
studies have evaluated this hypothesis in dysphoric 
subjects and not among clinically depressed patients. 
The equivocal nature of these results indicates that 
depressive realism remains a hypothesis and not a fact. 
While this is not the forum to discuss the similarities 
and differences between the cognitive-behavioral and 
constructivist approaches, it should be noted that the 
main objective of cognitive therapy for chronic pain is 
not, as Sullivan claims, ''to correct a distorted interpre-
tation of sensory events." Specific cognitive strategies 
may be used by cognitive-behavioral therapists to help 
patients learn to cope with pain through response-
transformation imagery/ but few cognitive therapists 
would agree with the statement that the problem of 
chronic pain is a problem of distorting sensory events. 
Turk and Meichenbaum 21 provide a concise description 
of cognitive-behavioral therapy: 
A central feature of the cognitive-behavioural treat-
ment is to facilitate the emergence of a new con-
ceptualisation of pain during the course of treat-
ment, thereby permitting the patient's symptoms to 
be viewed as circumscribed and addressable 
problems, rather than as vague, undifferentiated, 
overwhelming experience (pp. 1339-1340). 
Ultimately, the value of constructivist therapies for 
chronic pain will be determined on theoretical and prac-
tical grounds-are they sufficently unique in their theo-
retical underpinnings and predictions and do they help? 
One would hope this endeavor is undertaken with the 
same degree of experimental rigor that has character-
ized the validation of behavioral and cognitive-behav-
ioral therapies for chronic pain. 
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